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Can Ethical Theories Resolve Disagreements About Ag Biotech?
In the previous issue of The Forum (Vol. 5, No. 1), Dr. Robert Fullinwider argued that ethical theories cannot resolve disagreements about agricultural biotechnology. Dr. Fullinwiders's article referred to the work of Bernard Gert, a philosopher at Dartmouth College. Dr. Gert sent a letter to the editor of The Forum responding to Fullinwider and his letter became the basis of the essay printed here.
We invited Professor Fullinwider to answer Professor Gert, and Fullinwider's comment begins on page 4. A final note form Gert concludes this round of debate. We invite readers interested in continuing the discussion to write to the editor.
By Bernard Gert
As one of the very few philosophers who works both in moral theory and in applied and professional ethics, I am used to being criticized by those who engage in only one of these activities. Those who work only in moral theory often regard my attempt to use my account of morality in dealing with real moral problems as an indication that I do not really have a moral theory. They seem to hold that any philosophically adequate moral theory could not possible have any practical value. This same point of view is often held by those who work only in applies and professional ethics (see my article, "Morality Moral Theory, and Applies and Professional Ethics," Professional Ethics 1 [Spring/Summer 1992], pp.5-24). Thus when I received a copy of The Ag Bioethics Forum 5 (June 1993) and read the article "can Ethical Theories Resolve Disagreements About Ag Biotech? No," by Robert Fullinwider, I was not surprised.
I was surprised to note that I was one of the primary targets of Dr. Fullinwider's attack on the view that ethical theories can resolve disagreements about Ag Biotech. One of the distinctive features of my moral theory is that, in contrast with almost all other ethical theories including those put forward by Kant, the Utilitarians, Rawls, and their followers, I not only acknowledge but insist upon the fact that morality only limits the range of morally acceptable answers, it does not always provide a unique solution to a moral problem. I hold that it is very rare that any ethical theory, including mine, can resolve any controversial ethical disagreement. IT is thus very disturbing to me to have Dr. Fullinwider present my views as if I held that my list of moral rules would resolve disagreements in Ag Biotech.
I also do not understand why Dr. Fullinwider criticized the version of my moral theory contained in The Moral Rules (Harper and Row, 1970) for he knows, or at least should know, that I have presented a revised version of my theory in Morality (Oxford University Press, 1988). In that later book, I make a clear distinction between an account of the moral system (morality) which everyone uses to make moral decisions and the moral theory which is used to justify that system. The ten moral rules that Dr. Fullinwider quotes in his article are part if the moral system, they are not part of the moral theory. Even in The Moral Rules, these rules are not intended to solve moral problems, but to let one know when one has a moral problem. Everyone, including Dr. Fullinwider, agrees that whenever one breaks any of these rules one needs to justify that behavior or else one is acting immorally. I am not only aware that there is often a justification for breaking these rules, the main point of my account of morality is to make explicit the procedure we use for determining when a violation is justified. However, contrary to what is suggested by Dr. Fullinwider, I do not hold that this procedure will result in everyone agreeing on what ought to be done, even if they are all fully informed, impartial and rational. I repeatedly emphasize that people will often disagree on whether or not one ought to violate a given rule in the circumstances under consideration. But I also emphasize that there is a clear limit to legitimate moral disagreement. Finally, I make clear that most moral disagreements are based upon a disagreement about the facts. It is remarkable how often ignorance of the facts is responsible for indefensible remarks, e.g., Dr. Fullinwider's joke that one might settle for the original Ten Commandments rather than my list of moral rules is an indication that he does not know what is in that original list.
Dr. Fullinwider's criticisms of my moral theory are part of his general discontent with philosophy. Although he says "Philosophical questions are important" (p.3), it is not clear what they are important for, since it is clear that he thinks answering philosophical questions is of no practical importance. It may be that most of the philosophy that Dr. Fullinwider reads is of no practical importance, but it seems to me that before one concludes that any particular philosophical theory is of no practical importance, one should provide an accurate account of that theory. Dr. Fullinwider's remarks about my theory remind me of a refutation of my theory by a Professor of Law. She said that since all previous moral theories were mistaken, mine must also be mistaken. I agree that the inductive evidence is very strong against my theory being correct, or of any practical value, but it seems to me that to criticize my theory simply because it is a philosophical theory, without taking any trouble to present it accurately, is not an appropriate procedure.
On my account, a moral theory consists of an attempt to provide an explicit description of morality, i.e., the common moral system that we all use when deciding what to do in a situation calling for a moral decision. It also consists of an attempt to justify morality, i.e., to show that when properly describes, all rational persons would favor adopting morality as the guide to conduct that they would want taught to everyone in society to guide their conduct. On my vies, we all know what morality is just as we all know what grammar is. We make use of our knowledge of grammar in speaking and in interpreting the speech of others, But almost no one can provide an explicit account of the grammatical system that they use. Moral philosophers are like moral grammarians; they attempt to make explicit the moral system. The practical value of doing so is that it helps to prevent one form making moral mistakes because of one's special biases, loyalties, and interests. Now, all of us realize that slavery is morally unacceptable, but even a century ago, many people were so blinded by their biases, loyalties and interests that they actually defended slavery publicly. Today, many people are similarly blinded with regard to those who have a different sexual orientation. An explicit account of morality makes it more difficult for people to defend clearly immoral practices. It makes clear how what one had accepted as a morally acceptable practice, e.g., discrimination against some minority group, is inconsistent with the moral system that explains the vast majority of one's moral views.
Indeed, I think that the cases in which we disagree consist of a tiny percentage of the cases in which we make moral decisions. What confuses us is that we do not discuss the clear cases at all, e.g., no one seriously considers whether it might be morally acceptable to kill one's neighbor's cows in order to lessen competition. We discuss the controversial cases so much, e.g., whether we should ban bGH, that we mistakenly think most cases are like that. Even in the controversial cases, our disagreements are primarily based on disagreements about the facts, including disagreements about the consequences of adopting one policy or another. Recognition of the fact that most cases are clear cases allows me to formulate the moral system that explains the agreement; it also allows me to explain why some cases are controversial and why we disagree on those cases. Further, I make it clear that there are often differing interpretations of the moral rules. Dr. Fullinwider writes as if I though that the list of moral rules would provide a decision procedure for resolving moral disagreements without bringing in any knowledge of facts or social conventions. On the contrary, I hold exactly the opposite. It is most distressing to me to find myself presented as an example of just the kind of view that I so strongly criticize in my book.
Perhaps, what I say is of no practical value to people interested in moral problems posed by agricultural biotechnology. I do know that it has proved to be of practical value to the people at the Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center where I have been on the ethics committee for over a decade. I do know that the conceptual clarification I provided was of practical value to psychiatrists when I served as a consultant for the revision of the third edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R). I do know that it is very doubtful that I will be able to resolve any controversial matter in ag biotech, but I think it is much less doubtful that an explicit understanding of morality will be relevant to discussion of these controversial matters.
On account of morality, it is not a simple matter. I agree with Dr. Fullinwider that if one thinks that philosophy is going to provide some simple way of solving all moral disputes, one is in for a big disappointment. But it seems to me that the obvious response to this fact is to recognize that any procedure for resolving moral disputes is going to be complex. Further, it is not clear why clarifying the nature of a moral dispute and limiting the range of morally acceptable answers is not of practical use. To require that any adequate philosophical account of morality must be simple and resolve all moral disputes is to deny that one can give any adequate philosophical account of morality at all. Suppose Dr. Fullinwider were to insist that any adequate theory of cows would have to be given in one sentence, or even in ten. No one would tale him seriously. There is no reason to take him any more seriously when he talks about ethical theories.
By Robert Fullinwider
I regret that Professor Gert read my references to his thoery as an attack on it. What I attacked was not his theory, but the expectations of my audience - an audience of agricultural scientists by and large - that they would find in his (or any other) theory a solution to their practical questions. As I pointed out in footnote 9, Gert does not purport to be offering a practical guide but something else, a philosophical foundation. Indeed, I made this pont even more emphatically in the revised version of the talk delivered at Iowa State in May of 1993. (The version printed in Ag Bioethics Forum was delivered at Iowa State in May of 1992.) I regret that Professor Gert misunderstood the force of my remarks and regret, further, that the text printed in The Forum did not more clearly forestall such misunderstanding.
There may be substantive differences between Gert and myself, but I am not sure that we hold markedly different views. Let my say a further word about my argument in the article. Although the headnote in The Forum does not point this out, the article consists of remarks made as part of a debate on the practical usefulness of moral theory. My assignment was to argue the negative, to argue in effect that "ethical theories cannot resolve disagreements about agricultural biotechnology." Another philosopher argued the affirmative. So my remarks are more one-sided than they would be in a different context. In a context for fuller amplification, the first thing I would do is distinguish between things that are called "philosophy" and "moral theory," since whether books of philosophy and moral theory are practically helpful depends on what they are. O gesture in my article toward an implicit stipulation by characterizing philosophical questions as addressing the challenge of skepticism: how is it possible that there is obligation? how is it possible that there is knowledge? and the like. I think the historical core of philosophy has revolved around these questions; they define its central task.
But there are other inquiries, too, that are called philosophical, and that have a different aim. Where Plato wanted to pierce beyond the world of appearances to a vision of some other-worldly truth, Aristotle in most of his work aimed, rather, to describe carefully the main conceptual features of our own common world. His various treatises on ethics and politics are elaborate conceptual maps, distinguishing various virtues and goods from one another. Such map-making, if not at too general a level, may indeed help with the practical moral problems. Although Gert suggests that most moral disagreements "are based on disagreements about the facts," I am inclined to think that many of them arise not out of factual disputes but out of conceptual ineptness, just as many unclarities in writing and speaking arise from an imperfect or insecure command of grammatical distinctions, to take up Gert's analogy. For example, much of the current debate about multicultural pedagogies and school policies would be more tractable if the disputants did not conflate self-esteem, self-respect, and self-confidence. Some clarity about these concepts from moral psychology would make a lot of educational policy discussion more fruitful than it is. And philosophical books are often not a bad place to look for some such conceptual help, since philosophers have often engaged in the Aristotelian map-making enterprise. So philosophy books and moral theories might offer up several different things. They might offer us a way to another world (Plato) or they might offer us a more secure way around this world (Aristotle). With respect to this world, they may be content to map it in fine-grain or coarse, or they may seek to give it a foundation in reason (the anti- skepticism I spoke of). Different practical tasks might at one time or another usefully draw on some of this philosophical work. For, just as we have to distinguish among different kind of theory and different kinds of practical problems. For example, the practical task in question might be to cope with whole tradition's loss of authority. Suppose people in large number, perhaps because of the popularity of certain vulgar Neo- Nietzschean views, lose confidence in our "common moral system." Then, plausible accounts of how at least the basic structure of that system reflects a certain form of rationality might restore some confidence in it. Thus, we might want to draw on, or recommend, some of the most philosophical of philosophical work. These and many other complications would need to come into a full treatment of the question, "can ethical theory be of practical use?" But in a thirty-five minute "brief for the prosecution" before an audience of agricultural scientists concerned about matters such as bovine growth hormone, such complications would have muddied the picture rather than clarified it. So by indirect gesture and implication, I advised these scientists, in effect: "Don't look for answers about bovine growth hormone policy in works of extremely high generality aimed at showing a basic practice to be rationally justified in some sense." I expect Gert agrees with me on that advice.
If there are genuine differences between Professor Gert and me about moral theory and practical decision-making, I would enjoy exploring them further. But, again, I regret that he took my comments as an attack on his views.
By Bernard Gert
I think that Professor Fullinwider and I do not agree as much as he thinks that we do. He says, "Gert's enterprise is philosophical, not practical. It's a mistake, Gert himself tells us, to think the moral philosopher `should offer guides to conduct.' The philosopher, rather, offers a `foundation' or `justification' of morality as a whole." My enterprise is both philosophical and practical. The very first sentence of the preface to the first edition of The Moral Rules makes this clear: "This book is intended to make a difference, not only in one's understanding of morality, but also in the way one acts." Fullinwider's quote form me is somewhat misleading as my actual claim is that "The task of the moral philosopher is not to offer his own guide to conduct" (p. 9). It is the job of the moral philosopher to make explicit the guide to the conduct that is our common morality. I do think that my moral theory can be of practical use, especially my explicit account of our common morality.
Fullinwider makes it clear that Aristotle was engaged in conceptual clarification, so I do not see why he insists that moral theory cannot be of practical value. Pointing out the implications of the views that one holds, showing the inconsistencies in judgments, providing a common framework which one can use in arranging the facts, and making explicit all of the morally relevant features, are all part of my moral theory, especially my clear and explicit account of our common morality. I agree with him that morality is not simple, but neither is grammar, and yet an explicit account of grammar may be of practical use.
Does the Iowa Prairie have Intrinsic Value?
The Iowa State University Bioethics Program sponsored its fourth annual Fall Colloquium on Saturday night, the 16th of October, 1993. The topic was environmental ethics, and in particular, whether the Iowa prairie not only has instrumental value but, in addition, intrinsic value. Arguing for the affirmative was Dr. J. Baird Callicot, professor of philosophy ans Coordinator of the Letters and Sciences Program Environmental Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Arguing for the negative was Dr. Lilly- Marlene Russow, associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University.
The debate at Iowa State was very successful, perhaps in part because it was not unrehearsed. Professors Callicot and Russow spoke on the same subject the previous afternoon, on Friday the 15th of October, at the University of Illinois. (At the U. of I., the debate was called a colloquium on whether the Illinios prairie had intrinsic value, but the speaker's philosophical positions were properly unaffected by the advertising gambit!) The debate at Illinois was the inaugural event of the fledgling University of Illinois Bioethics Program, a program made possible by a grant form the U.S. Department of Agriculture and modeled on the Bioethics Program at Iowa State University. For more information about the Illinois program, see the story on the front page of The Forum, Vol.5, No. 1.
Over 200 faculty and students attended the debate on Friday afternoon in Urbana, suggesting that university campuses are eager for philosophical instruction about moral issues regarding the environment. Edited versions of the Callicot and Russow speeches will appear in the next issue of this newsletter.
About the ISU Bioethics Program
The Iowa State University Bioethics Program began in 1986 with start-up funds form a statute passes by the Iowa state legislature. The current mission of the program is four-fold:
We invite readers interested in ethical issues related to science and technology in general and to agriculture in particular, to contact the Program for further information. We also invite you to send us names and addresses of colleagues you think would enjoy receiving The Forum at no cost.