Larry S. Temkin, Rice University
Part I. Introduction
In the opening sentence of his powerful book, Living High and
Letting Die, Peter Unger notes that "Each year millions of children
die from easy to beat disease, from malnutrition, and from bad
drinking water;" indeed, as he notes, "in each of the past 30 years,
well over 10 million children died from readily preventable causes."
(1) Our question is as simple as it is poignant. What, if anything,
should our reactions be to the fact that each one of us could easily
prevent the deaths of many innocent children.
This is a topic that is all too easy to comfortably
ignore&emdash;even as our actions, or inactions, literally and
indisputably make the difference for whether innocent children live
or die.
It is a topic that cries out for careful, detailed, and rigorous
arguments that can't possibly be presented in the space allotted. So
this article is doomed to be superficial and unsatisfying. Still, I
can present some relevant considerations that may help provide a
framework for thinking about this crucially important topic, even if
they do not settle it.
Part II. Possible Responses
Putting the question as I did above, it may seem there is an
obvious response as to what we should do. But in fact the question
provokes a wide-range of responses. At one end of the spectrum are
those, like Garrett Hardin, who argue that we should do nothing to
prevent the deaths of distant children, indeed, that it is actually
bad to aid such children, claiming that for every child we save today
five will die tomorrow. (2)
Others claim that we may help unfortunate children if we like, but we
may also permissibly ignore their plight. There are at least three
different bases for this position. The first is a deep skepticism
about morality itself. On this view there is no right or wrong, hence
nothing we do is wrong, and so failing to help the world's needy
cannot be wrong. The second is a kind of contractualist, or social
convention, view of morality. On this view, right and wrong simply
reflect the agreements of rational self-interested agents. Thus, I
act wrongly only if I violate my freely chosen moral agreements, and
if I don't want to join an agreement requiring me to help the world's
children that's up to me. A third view is a libertarian position. On
this view, people are free to act however they want, so long as they
do not violate anyone else's rights against non-aggression. On this
view, people have a right not to be attacked, and I act wrongly, or
unjustly, if I violate that right, but they have no right against me
to be aided, and hence I do not act wrongly, or unjustly, if I fail
to aid the needy.
At the other end of the spectrum, some think that we must do
everything we possibly can to help the needy. In principle, this may
include giving away all of our wealth and belongings until we are no
better off than those we are hoping to aid. On this view, we must be
prepared to sacrifice all of our personal interests, including those
of our family, for the sake of aiding as many as possible. Moreover,
not only must we sacrifice our own interests, we should do whatever
is necessary to prevent avoidable deaths, even if this requires
sacrificing the interests of others. Indeed, even if it requires
stealing from, harming, or possibly even killing some for the sake of
saving more numerous others. Utilitarians have long been associated
with such positions, but other powerful arguments supporting some of
these views have been famously advanced by Peter Singer, and more
recently, Peter Unger.(3)
As is often the case in moral philosophy, the truth about this issue
is complicated, and difficult to discern, but it almost certainly
lies between the extremes noted above. Surely we do not have to do
everything possible to save as many as possible. But neither can we
simply ignore the world's children. We must, I am confident, do much
more than most of us do to alleviate hunger and illness.
Part III. A Framework
So far I have only offered assertions. Let me next offer a
framework for thinking about our topic.
I spent fifteen years working on a book about equality. Because of
this, people expect me to defend my views about the needy in
egalitarian terms. But that is a mistake. There is a strong tendency
for people to think about what ideal they value most, and then to
address every moral issue in terms of that ideal. So, for example,
utilitarians, libertarians, and egalitarians address issues in terms
of what would be best with respect to utility, freedom, or equality,
respectively.
Such narrow, single-minded, focus is deeply mistaken. The truth about
morality is complex, and there isn't just one thing that matters
morally. There are many relevant factors regarding most moral issues,
and what we need, as people concerned about fundamental moral issues,
are not simple pat answers, but careful, thoughtful, subtle,
consideration of all the relevant factors. We need to be pluralists
about moral values; that is, to think about issues
pluralistically.
So let me suggest one pluralistic model for thinking about today's
topic.
Historically, many philosophers have focused on three different
approaches as morally fundamental.
The first addresses the question: "How ought the world to be?" The
focus here is on the value of outcomes, of what
happens.
The second addresses the question: "What kind of person ought
I to be?" The focus here is on the character of moral
agents.
The third addresses the question: "What ought I to do?" The focus
here is on the moral assessment of particular actions, and in
particular on the notion of agent-relative duties or
obligations.
These three approaches correspond, respectively, to what philosophers
call consequentialist, virtue, and deontological moralities. Many
argue issues in terms of just one of these approaches. But this is
another mistake. The human enterprise of trying to figure out how to
live properly, and in harmony, with ourselves, others, and the larger
world requires that we take a broad perspective. The fully moral
life&emdash;the fully human life&emdash;requires that we pay
attention to each of these concerns: to what
happens&emdash;whether as a result of what we do or fail to
do; to the kind of person we are&emdash;whether virtuous or
vicious; and to our duties and obligations&emdash;to ourselves and
others.
So I submit we need to address today's topic from all three
perspectives. And when one does that, it becomes clear that there is
substantial moral reason to be concerned about the world's needy.
For example, if you ask which outcome is better, one in which many
innocent children painfully die of easily avoidable hunger and
disease, or one in which affluent Americans have fewer toys and
sweaters, eat out less, or have fewer kitchen appliances, it seems
clear that on any plausible theory of the good the latter outcome
would be better than the former.
Likewise, there is little doubt that among the most central and
important virtues are the virtues of beneficence, sympathy,
compassion, and generosity. But then, if one takes seriously the
notion that the kind of person I ought to be, or the kind of life I
ought to lead, is a virtuous one, surely at some point one must give
priority to the easily preventable hunger and illness of innocent
children over further acquisition of goods that one doesn't need,
will hardly use, and wouldn't miss if one didn't have. For the truly
virtuous person, ignoring the world's children is not an option.
Finally, we turn to the trickiest category, the question of duty.
Some people, like Jan Narveson,(4) believe that it would be nice of
us to benefit the needy, but that this lies within the domain of
charity and is merely a matter of the heart. On his view, as I
understand it, our duties consist in respecting rights, and while
people have a strong negative right not to be interfered with, they
do not have a positive right to be aided. As such, we do not violate
anyone's rights, or act unjustly, if we fail to aid the needy.
Now many would dispute Narveson's claims, and insist that people do
have a positive right to aid, but I am inclined to grant Narveson's
terminological position, and accept that the needy don't have a right
against me for aid, and that I don't act unjustly if I ignore their
plight. But I also believe that our duties and obligations extend
significantly beyond merely respecting people's rights, and that
people can and often do act deeply wrongly even if they don't act
unjustly.
So-called "positive" duties to aid others are often regarded as weak,
broad, imperfect, and meritorious, while "negative" duties are
regarded as strict, narrow, perfect, and unexceptionable. But these
divisions are deeply misleading. Positive duties are still duties,
and one acts wrongly if one fails to fulfill them. Moreover, a
positive duty can be as strict or compelling as a negative duty.
Likewise, failing to fulfill a positive duty can be worse&emdash;that
is significantly more open to moral criticism&emdash;than failing to
fulfill a negative duty, even if the latter involves a violation of
rights, and hence an injustice, while the former doesn't.
To see this, consider variations of two classic examples. Suppose
John is one of twenty people walking by a pond in which a young child
is drowning. If John can save the child he has a duty to do so, even
though the child has no special right against John, or any of the
others, that he be saved. To be sure, if one of the others jumps in
and saves the child, John is relieved of the responsibility of doing
so, but if no one else jumps in, John must. So when John lets the
child drown to preserve his suit, he acts wrongly, even though he has
lots of company in that regard, and even though I am assuming he
would not be violating the child's rights and hence would not be
acting unjustly if he failed to help.
On the other hand, suppose Tom and Tim have been given a box of candy
to share. Tom takes one extra piece. Since this piece belongs to Tim,
Tom is, in essence, stealing. He is taking what doesn't belong to him
and in so doing he violates Tim's right and acts unjustly. Still,
while Tom has violated a negative duty and John has "merely" violated
a positive duty, John's inaction&emdash;his failure to save the
drowning child&emdash;is morally much worse than Tom's action of
stealing a piece of Tim's candy. John's inaction is deeply and
importantly wrong, and is open to much more serious moral criticism
than Tom's action is.
This raises another important point. It is often assumed that the
difference between positive and negative duties is that while the
latter are strict&emdash;and must be fulfilled in precise
ways&emdash;the former allow for great leeway in how one fulfills
them. So, the latter are thought to be like giving to charity, where
it is optional as to where, when, how, and perhaps even whether, one
chooses to fulfill this duty. But this is a grave mistake. It
conflates the category of positive duties&emdash;acts that we have a
duty to perform, perhaps on behalf of others&emdash;with the
category of supererogation&emdash;acts that are above and beyond the
call of duty. It is true that positive duties are not typically
construed as particular duties to particular people, so there are
often various ways one might adequately discharge them. But one
cannot simply ignore them, without acting wrongly, nor can one
fulfill them any way one wants.
Suppose, to modify another famous example, I see three runaway
trolleys hurtling down the tracks. If I do nothing, the first trolley
will plough into five people killing them all, the second will hit
one person severing his foot, and the third will destroy an expensive
car. Assuming that with little effort I can stop one, and only one of
the trolleys, and that I have no personal connections with anyone
involved, it seems clear that I ought, morally, to stop the first
trolley. Indeed, even assuming that no one has a right against
me that I act at all, and hence that I can't be accused of acting
unjustly if I do nothing, it still seems clear that I act
wrongly if I sit idly by and do nothing. Likewise, it seems
clear that I would also act wrongly if I chose to save the car, or
even if I chose to save the person's foot. Like negative duties, some
positive duties are more pressing, or urgent, and it is not up to me
to simply choose to do anything at all, much less nothing at all. At
least, it is not up to me if I don't want to be open to serious moral
criticism.
The preceding considerations suggest that we do have duties and
obligations to help others, and that we cannot simply choose whether
and how to fulfill them. Almost certainly, if we want to act rightly,
we must address the most urgent needs before addressing other needs.
Almost certainly, this means that to fulfill our positive duties to
aid others we must address the easily preventable deaths of innocent
children, before we make our contributions to fostering literacy,
promoting the environment, or&emdash;dare I say it&emdash;higher
education!
Does this mean that we can't give to other valuable causes
that matter to us? No, but it suggests that we must do so as
voluntary acts that are, in fact, above and beyond the call of
duty. This requires that we may permissibly give to such causes only
after first fulfilling our positive duty to respond to the most
urgent needs of others. How much must we actually do regarding the
latter, before we can legitimately turn to the former? I'm not sure,
but I think the old adage of "giving till it hurts" might be a useful
place to start. Consistent with meeting our other duties and
obligations, perhaps we must give to prevent starvation and illness
at least up to the point where further giving would genuinely worsen
our lives significantly. At that point, if we choose to give further,
perhaps we then have the option of giving to the cause of our
choice.
In sum, taking a pluralistic approach to morality, it seems clear
that most of us should do much more to benefit the world's children.
We should do this for consequentialist reasons&emdash;to make the
world a better place; for virtuous reasons&emdash;because that is the
kind of person one should want to be, and the kind of life one should
want to lead; and for deontological reasons&emdash;because aiding the
needy is not simply an option, it is a duty that can be every bit as
urgent and strict as our duties to respect rights and act justly.
Part IV. We Could Do Better
So far, I have mainly considered whether American's should do
more than they do. Let me end by reminding the reader how
unbelievably fortunate we, in America, truly are. And,
correspondingly, how easy it would be for us to do so much
more than we do.
First, a general reminder about how wealthy America is. In 1995, the
world's total Gross Domestic Product (GDP)&emdash;that is the value
of all goods and services produced within the geographical borders of
the world's countries, was estimated to be 26.5 trillion in U.S.
dollars. The United States, with its population of 263 million
people, representing 4% of the world's population, had an estimated
Gross Domestic Product of 7.1 trillion, or 29% of the entire world's
GDP. To put this in perspective, let me note that the United States's
GDP exceeded the total GDP of 180 of the world's 196 countries. Those
countries, listed in the appendix, had a combined GDP of only 6.8
trillion dollars, and between them contained 82% of the world's
population.(5)
So, obviously, the United States is extraordinarily wealthy. But
doesn't the United States government already give billions and
billions to help the world's starving masses? Well, sort of. In 1997,
the combined value of all U.S. governmental international development
and humanitarian assistance amounted to 6.5 billion dollars. Now
setting aside the fact that much of that goes to prop up foreign
governments and businesses with whom America has strong political and
economic ties, what our government gives is a pittance compared to
our other expenditures: for example, the 45 billion we spend on the
Office of Personnel Management, the 267 billion we pay for national
defense, or the 380 billion we pay for the treasury department.
Indeed, our 1997 governmental expenditures exceeded 1.6 trillion
dollars, meaning the total of 6.5 billion we spent on international
development and humanitarian assistance represented less than one
half of one per cent of our governmental spending.(6)
Still, many will think that is how it should be. Our
government shouldn't be spending on foreigners, that is up to
individual citizens to do if they want to act rightly, or virtuously.
So let us next consider the charitable contributions of Americans as
individuals&emdash;the self-described "most generous people on
Earth."
It is true that in 1997 Americans gave a total of 154 billion to
philanthropic causes, either as individuals, or through foundations,
corporations, or charitable bequests. But the vast majority of that
went to religious institutions, alma maters, and so on, and only a
small fraction of it, two billion, went to international aid. Still,
two billion sure seems like a big number, so let me note a few other
figures for comparison. In 1997, individual Americans spent 43
billion dollars on toys and sports equipment, 80 billion on tobacco
products, 85 billion on alcohol, 402 billion on recreation, and 513
billion on eating out. This means that individual Americans would
have to contribute as much as they spent on international relief for
approximately five hundred and sixty years, before they would
have spent as much as they spent last year alone on toys, recreation,
booze, tobacco, and eating out!
These numbers may all seem too big and abstract to mean much. So let
me end with a few trivial, but revealing, observations. Consider the
following list of different products that Americans might have in
their home, each of which serves the function of warming food or
drink: conventional oven, convection oven, crock pot, stove, wok,
microwave, toaster over, toaster, pizza maker, fry baby, coffee
maker, roaster, expresso machine, popcorn maker, grill, bun warmer,
rotisserie, bagel toaster, hot water dispenser, fondue pot, waffle
iron, electric frying pan, rice cooker, omelette maker, corner
bakery, electric griddle, crepe maker, cappacino maker, teapot,
coffee cup warmer, bread machine, egg poacher, steam table, etc.
How many of these do you, dear reader, have? How many of these do you
actually use? How many do you really need? And isn't it just a bit
amazing that so many people you know own a large number of these
items?
Next, I note the following. I live in Houston, Texas It is hot in
Houston. Very hot. I don't have much occasion to wear sweaters or
coats. Indeed, most of the year I wear shorts and t-shirts. Yet
recently I did a quick inventory of my closets and found fifteen
sweaters, twelve sweat shirts, four sweat suits, and eleven jackets
or coats. That is forty-two things to keep me warm&emdash;in a
climate where I could easily make do with three! Moreover, I am
constantly giving clothes away, and am, in fact, one of the least
materialistic people I know. For example, I don't have a maid, don't
use a lawn service, don't own a cell phone, and I "only" have two
television sets!
Finally, I confess, I was going to count my children's barbie dolls,
stuffed animals, beanie babies, and other toys, but I realized I
didn't have the time, or heart, to do so. It is
embarrassing&emdash;and indeed shameful and obscene&emdash;how much
junk flows into my home each year for three children who don't need
anything, when so many children face death from easily preventable
causes.
Part V. Conclusion
The degree to which we are morally blameworthy for not aiding
someone in need is partly a function of how dire the need is, and how
much it would cost us to do so&emdash;not only monetarily, but in
terms of humanly valuable projects, relationships, responsibilities,
and commitments. But surely, by such criteria, we are open to serious
moral criticism when we basically ignore&emdash;as most of us
do&emdash;the tragic plight of innocent children suffering from
preventable hunger or disease. Clearly, each of us could do vastly
more than we do to help the world's children, and we could do so
without making a dent in our affluent lifestyle. That we don't is a
serious moral failing.
Appendix
Listing of 180 Countries by Gross Domestic Prroduct 1995 (US$
MILLIONS)
Combined GDP of these countries is less than the United States's
GDP.
Source: World Economic Fact Book, London: Euromonitor,
1996
1. Tuvalu (5.8) 2. Sao Tomé e Príncipe (22.3) 3.
Kiribati (32.9) 4. Anguilla (55.9) 5. Equatorial Guinea (129.0) 6.
Western Samoa (133.6) 7. Maldives (135.3) 8. British Virgin Island
(167.6) 9. Tonga (169.4) 10. Solomon Islands (184.4) 11. Nauru
(186.5) 12. Vanuatu (195.2) 13. Dominica (209.7) 14. St. Kitts
(291.7) 15. Guinea-Bissau (227.9) 16. St. Vincent & The
Grenadines (233.6) 17. Gibraltar (240.6) 18. Bhutan (253.7) 19.
Grenada (275.7) 20. American Samoa (311.1) 21. Comoros (318.5) 22.
Djibouti (330.3) 23. Gambia (338.9) 24. Antigua (418.3) 25. Cape
Verde (436.9) 26. Seychelles (495.3) 27. Monaco (526.3) 28. Guyana
(535.9) 29. St. Lucia (550.5) 30. Belize (579.7) 31. Guadeloupe
(634.5) 32. French Guiana (697.5) 33. Aruba (698.2) 34. French
Polynesia (771.7) 35. Lesotho (836.1) 36. Sierra Leone (837.2) 37.
Swaziland (847.6) 38. Kyrgyzstan (855.5) 39. Malawi (895.6) 40.
Somalia (928.5) 41. Rwanda (961.0) 42. Guam (1027.0) 43. Cayman
Islands (1049.0) 44. Mauritania (1127.9) 45. Mongolia (1155.0) 46.
Burundi (1165.0) 47. Chad (1221.3) 48. Liechtenstein (1269.4) 49.
Mozambique (1370.1) 50. Macedonia (1538.0) 51. Andorra (1548.4) 52.
Central African Republic (1597.4) 53. Laos (1754.3) 54. Suriname
(1817.3) 55. Barbados (1822.1) 56. Netherlands Antilles (1856.3) 57.
Nicaragua (1921.0) 58. Bermuda (1966.9) 59. Fiji (2021.3) 60. Mali
(2030.9) 61. Togo (2060.8) 62. Niger (2115.9) 63. Benin (2118.7) 64.
Guinea (2271.8) 65. Liberia (2312.3) 66. Tajikistan (2516.4) 67.
Bahamas (2583.5) 68. Martinique (2657.5) 69. Congo (2698.0) 70. Malta
(3205.2) 71. Namibia (3232.0) 72. Burkina Faso (3344.4) 73. Zambia
(3450.0) 74. Madagascar (3520.8) 75. Estonia (3523.6) 76. Haiti
(3554.8) 77. Tanzania (3596.8) 78. Mauritius (3916.0) 79. Honduras
(3994.7) 80. New Caledonia (4053.4) 81. Nepal (4139.1) 82. Latvia
(4471.9) 83. Botswana (4479.8) 84. Armenia (4522.7) 85. Jamaica
(4793.2) 86. Bahrain (5021.9) 87. Ethiopia (5394.4) 88. Senegal
(5428.7) 89. Papau New Guinea (5475.3) 90. Trinidad and Tobago
(5532.2) 91. Réunion (5537.7) 92. Turkmenistan (5631.0) 93.
Macau (5696.9) 94. Gabon (5814.0) 95. Uganda (5833.0) 96. Albania
(5849.4) 97. Lebanon (6039.4) 98. Zimbabwe (6106.4) 99. Lithuania
(6114.5) 100. Jordan (6587.0) 101. Bolivia (6958.4) 102. Iceland
(7030.4) 103. Ghana (7052.2) 104. Cameroon (7236.9) 105. Cöte
d'lvoire (7626.3) 106. Panama (7756.7) 107. Kenya (8012.7) 108. Qatar
(8399.2) 109. Zaire (8500.0) 110. Cyprus (8577.8) 111. Paraguay
(8920.6) 112. Belarus (9108.0) 113. El Salvador (9590.3) 114. Costa
Rica (9700.0) 115. North Korea (11028.5) 116. Bulgaria (11113.9) 117.
Brunei (11494.0) 118. Dominican Republic (11669.5) 119. Oman
(12011.7) 120. Luxemburg (12437.2) 121. Sri Lanka (12587.6) 122.
Guatemala (15789.6) 123. Uruguay (15796.1) 124. Kazakhstan (16350.0)
125. Slovakia (17400.0) 126. Tunisia (18164.2) 127. Ecuador (18395.4)
128. Croatia (19951.8) 129. Slovenia (21229.1) 130. Uzbekistan
(23060.0) 131. Azerbaijan (23075.2) 132. Kuwait (25828.2) 133.
Vietnam (26150.7) 134. Bangladesh (28055.9) 135. Sudan (28302.6) 136.
Libya (30441.6) 137. Romania (33699.6) 138. Morocco (35012.9) 139.
United Arab Emirates (37149.4) 140. Syria (39000.0) 141. Cuba
(40502.0) 142. Puerto Rico (40638.1) 143. Algeria (42514.6) 144. raq
(45456.0) 145. Czech Republic (45632.5) 146. Hungary (45757.1) 147.
Peru (57986.9) 148. Ireland (58281.2) 149. New Zealand (58393.6) 150.
Pakistan (58592.8) 151. Egypt (60294.1) 152. Nigeria (65570.5) 153.
Chile (67332.6) 154. Philippines (74136.2) 155. Myanmar (75100.0)
156. Venezuela (75831.1) 157. Colombia (76384.1) 158. Singapore
(81308.0) 159. Israel (83743.9) 160. Malaysia (84054.1) 161. Ukraine
(90370.0) 162. Portugal (97863.6) 163. Poland (104388.4) 164. Greece
(110332.5) 165. Finland (125871.9) 166. Saudi Arabia (126517.8) 167.
South Africa (133504.4) 168. Hong Kong (143591.7) 169. Thailand
(166479.9) 170. Indonesia (170684.9) 171. Turkey (175893.3) 172.
Taiwan (237659.5) 173. Mexico (238489.1) 174. Belgium (261092.3) 175.
Switzerland (305593.2) 176. Argentina (306055.3) 177. India
(338673.8) 178. Netherlands (383850.9) 179. Brazil (550000.0) 180.
China (690586.1)
Listing of World's 16 Countries with Highest Gross Domestic Product
1995 (US$ MILLIONS)
1. Norway (145984.2) 2. Denmark (171071.4) 3. Austria (197468.4) 4.
Sweden (219947.1) 5. Australia (344380.2) 6. South Korea (455570.5)
7. Spain (559431.9) 8. Canada (562356.9) 9. Russia (684392.0) 10.
Iran (730000.0) 11. Italy (1038867.7) 12. United Kingdom (1103945.1)
13. France (1538701.9) 14. Germany (2126223.8) 15. Japan (5089310.8)
16. USA (7080000.0)
Footnotes
1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 4-5.
2. Hardin's classic, and frequently reprinted, article on this topic
is "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," which
originally appeared in Psychology Today Magazine, 1974 by
Ziff-Davis Publishing Company.
3. See Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and
Public Affairs 1, no. 3, 1972, and Unger's Living High and
Letting Die.
4. Narveson's views on this matter are expressed in the accompanying
article in this issue.
5. The information in this paragraph was gleaned from the World
Economic Fact Book, London: Euromonitor, 1996
6. Information in this and the following two paragraphs was gleaned
from U.S. Statistics at a Glance: Annual Summary of Demographic
and Economic Indicators, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economics, and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the
Census, Data User Services Division, 1998.